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An equitable approach to creditor noncompliance with section 9504(3) of New York's Uniform Commercial Code: Siemens Credit
Corp. v. Marvik Colour,Inc.
In the ideal secured transaction, the debtor fulfills its obligation to the secured party by making timely payments. Frequently, however, the debtor defaults on its payments and the
secured party is forced to repossess the collateral in which he
has a security interest. After repossession, the secured party
can either retain the collateral in full satisfaction of the debtor's
obligation1 or sell it and apply the proceeds 2 to the outstanding
debt.3 Under section 9-504(3) of the New York Uniform Commercial Code ("New York Code"), the secured party must give the
debtor "reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or ... the time after which any private sale" will take
place.4 In addition, all aspects of the sale must be made in a

'N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (McKinney 1990). A secured party "may reduce his claim
to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available
judicial procedure." Id. A secured party has the right to take possession of the collateral upon default, without judicial process, but only to the extent that repossesion
can be accomplished without breach of the peace. Id. § 9-503. Moreover, if provided
in the security agreement, the secured party may require the debtor to assemble the
specified collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place that is reasonably convenient for both parties. Id.
2 Proceeds include "whatever is received upon the sale,
exchange, collection or
other disposition of collateral." N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (McKinney 1990). Money,
checks, and other deposit accounts are considered "cash proceeds." Id.
3 "A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all
of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable
preparation or processing." N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (McKinney 1990). The disposition
of collateral may be done publicly or privately. Id. § 9-504(3). For a purchase money
security interest involving consumer goods, if the debtor has paid 60% of the cash
price, the secured party must dispose of the collateral within 90 days of taking possession. Id. § 9-505(1). The debtor has the right, however, to redeem the collateral
before the secured party disposes of it. Id. § 9-506. The debtor must also fulfill all
obligations as to the collateral and reimburse the secured party for all expenses in
taking possession, holding, and preparing the collateral for disposition. Id. If the secured party does not proceed in disposing of the collateral as outlined in the New
York Uniform Commercial Code ("New York Code") the party can be "ordered restrained on appropriate terms and conditions." Id. § 9-507(1).
4 N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (McKinney 1990). Notice must also be sent to any other
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commercially reasonable manner.
After disposition of the collateral, the debtor is entitled to
the surplus of the proceeds over the outstanding debt.6 If the
proceeds are insufficient to repay the indebtedness, the secured
party may recover a deficiency judgment from the debtor. In response to the secured party's action for a deficiency judgment,
the debtor often asserts that the secured party failed to comply
with the notice and reasonableness requirements of section 9504(3).' Upon proof of such a defense, the question becomes
secured party for which the secured party disposing of the collateral has received
written notice of a claim or an interest in the collateral, before notification was sent
to the debtor. Id. Despite these requirements, the New York Code does not define
the term "reasonable notification." See infra notes 47-50.The Official Comment to §
9-504, however, gives some indication of the drafters' intent. "[Alt a minimum it
must be sent in such time that persons entitled to receive it will have sufficient time
to take appropriate steps to protect their interests by taking part in the sale or
other disposition if they so desire." N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504 Note 5 at 555 (McKinney
1990). Thus, the notice requirement benefits the debtor because "[w]ith notice the
debtor can take steps to assure that the collateral will not be sacrificed for less than
its true value and thereby minimize or eliminate any potential deficiency judgment."
CHRISTINE A. FERRIS & BENNETT H. GOLDSTEIN, DISPOSITION OF REPOSSESSED
COLLATERAL UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 32-33 (1990) (footnotes omitted). In essence, notice gives the debtor the opportunity to cause potential bidders to
attend the sale which can increase the sale price. ARNOLD B. COHEN, GUIDE TO
SECURED LENDING TRANSACTIONS 9I 6.03[2][d], at 6-18 (1988); see also Marine Midland Bank-Rochester v. Vaeth, 88 Misc. 2d 657, 659-60, 388 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1976) (explaining purpose of notice to debtor). In determining
whether reasonable notice has been given, all the circumstances surrounding the
notice should be examined to determine if the purpose of the notice requirement
was furthered or frustrated. First Bank & Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 123 Misc. 2d 386,
393, 473 N.Y.S.2d 697, 702 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1984); see FERRIS &
GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 35. Courts may consider such circumstances as the type of
sale, sophistication of the parties involved, extent to which the parties have been in
contact, physical distances involved, and the nature of the collateral. Id. at 77.
5 N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (McKinney 1990). As with the concept of"reasonable notification," the term "commercial reasonableness" is not defined in the New York
Code. "The foundation of commercial reasonableness is the actual commercial practice relevant to the particular kind of collateral disposed of at the particular time
and place of its disposition." FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 3.
6 N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (McKinney 1990). If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus upon sale.
Id. "But if the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the
debtor is entitled to any surplus ... only if the security agreement so provides." Id.
' Id. If the underlying transaction involves a sale of accounts or chattel paper, the
debtor is liable for any deficiency only if such a remedy is provided the secured
party in the security agreement. Id.
8 See, e.g., Hoch v. Ellis, 627 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Alaska 1981) (finding defendant's
sale of repossessed collateral deficient because there was no notification of sale);
Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 453 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ark. 1970) (acknowledging
distinction between counterclaims and affirmative actions under § 9-507(1) and us-
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whether the secured party remains entitled to a deficiency judgment in the absence of any express rule in the New York Code.
Federal and state courts throughout the country are split on this
issue, but have generally adopted one of three approaches.9
In addition to division among the states, the departments of
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York also
disagree about which of the approaches is correct. The Second
Department imposes an "absolute bar" to recovery of a deficiency
judgment if the secured party fails to comply with section 9504(3)." The Third Department applies a "setoff" approach in
which the debtor must prove the amount of any damages sustained due to the secured party's noncompliance; the deficiency
judgment is thereafter reduced by the amount of such damages.1'
The First and Fourth Departments hold that noncompliance creates a "rebuttable presumption" that the fair market value of the
collateral is equal to the outstanding debt thereby shifting the
burden of proving the deficiency to the secured party.' Recently,
ing noncompliance with § 9-504(3) as defense); Alliance Discount Corp. v. Shaw, 171
A.2d 548, 549 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (averring as defense plaintiffs failure to comply
with § 9-504(3)).
9 The strictest approach imposes an absolute bar to a deficiency judgment for a
secured party's noncompliance with the statute. See, e.g., Chittenden Trust Co. v.
Andre Noel Sports, 621 A.2d 215, 219 (Vt. 1992); see also infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing "absolute bar" approach). The second approach mandates that the debtor prove any damages caused by noncompliance and "set-off" the
deficiency judgment to that extent. See, e.g., Chapman v. Field, 602 P.2d 481, 485
(Ariz. 1979); see also infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (discussing "set-off"
approach). The third method constructs a rebuttable presumption that the value of
the collateral was equal to the debt. See, e.g., Bank of Chapmanville v. Workman,
406 S.E.2d 58, 64 (W. Va. 1991); see also infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text
(discussing "rebuttable presumption" approach). See generally FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 5 (discussing lack of uniformity in law with respect to disposition of
collateral); Michael Vanderford, Note, Secured Transactions in Arkansas, Bank of
Bearden v. Simpson: Living with Both the Rebuttable Presumption and the Absolute
Bar,46 ARK. L. REV. 475, 478-79 (1993) (discussing approaches to noncompliance of
§ 9-504(3)).
10 E.g., Central Budget Corp. v. Garrett, 48 A.D.2d 825, 368 N.Y.S.2d 268 (2d
Dep't 1975); Long Island Bank v. Knight, 122 Misc. 2d 878, 473 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App.
Term 2d and 11th Jud. Dists. 1983); see also infra notes 70-82 and accompanying
text (discussing absolute bar rule).
11 E.g., Stanchi v. Kemp, 48 A.D.2d 973, 370 N.Y.S.2d 26 (3d Dep't 1975); see also
N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (McKinney 1990); infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text
(discussing setoff rule). See generally Kathryn Page, A Secured Party's Right to a
Deficiency Judgment After Noncompliance with the Resale Provisionsof Article 9, 60
N.D. L. REv. 531, 535 (1984) (discussing same).
12 E.g., Telmark, Inc. v. Lavigne, 124 A.D.2d 1055, 508 N.Y.S.2d 737 (4th Dep't
1986); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc., 79 A.D.2d 509, 433
N.Y.S.2d 574 (1st Dep't 1980); Security Trust Co. v. Thomas, 59 A.D.2d 242, 399
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in Siemens Credit Corp. v. Marvik Colour, Inc.," the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York applied a combination of the rebuttable presumption and setoff
rules in holding that a creditor's noncompliance with the statutory provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code does not absolutely bar a deficiency judgment;"' instead, at trial the secured
party must rebut the presumption that fair market value equals
the outstanding debt, while the debtor is entitled to any damages
it proves as a result of noncompliance with section 9-504(3). 1"
In Siemens Credit, Siemens Credit Corporation ("Siemens")
was the assignee of a security agreement ("Agreement") between
Marvik Colour, Inc. ("Marvik") and Linotype-Hell Graphic
("Linotype") in connection with Marvik's purchase of a computer
system from Linotype. 6 The Agreement granted Linotype a purchase money security interest in the computer system.17 Marvik
defaulted on the payments under the Agreement and Siemens
filed an action to recover the past due amounts. 8 Siemens demanded the return of the computer system from Marvik, but
Marvik refused. 9 Eventually, Marvik complied with Siemens'
request, and Linotype, acting as Siemens' agent, refurbished the
system and sold it for an amount less than the full amount of the
outstanding debt.2" Siemens sought recovery of the deficiency, 2'
N.Y.S.2d 511 (4th Dep't 1977); see also infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text
(discussing rebuttable presumption approach).
"3859 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
at 692.
'4 Id.
15 Id. at 693.
"Id. at 690.
"Id. A purchase money security interest is one that is "taken or retained by the
seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price." N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-107(a)
(McKinney 1990); see Heidelberg Eastern, Inc. v. Weber Lithography Inc., 213
A.D.2d 127, 129, 631 N.Y.S.2d 370, 372 (2d Dep't 1995) (discussing transaction in
which seller maintained purchase money security interest in printing press).
18 Siemens Credit, 859 F. Supp. at 690. After Marvik filed its answer, it commenced a third party action against Linotype for breach of contract, warranty, negligence, and fraud. Id.
Marvik would not return the computer system until Siemens refunded
'9 Id.
Marvik's $50,000 down payment and compensated Marvik for $100,000 installation
costs. Id. Siemens responded by making a motion to compel Marvik to pay for its
continued use of the computer system. Eventually, Marvik returned the equipment
to Siemens. Id. at 690-91.
20 Siemens Credit, 859 F. Supp. at 691. The parties stipulated
that Siemens could
dispose of the collateral in any way consistent with the Agreement or the New York
Code. Id.
21 Id.; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing § 9-504(2) which makes
debtor liable for deficiency resulting from sale). Under New York Code § 9-504(2),
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but Marvik claimed that since Siemens did not notify Marvik of
the sale, Siemens lost its right to a deficiency judgment.'
Marvik's argument was based on New York Code section 9504(3) which expressly requires the secured party to provide reasonable notification of sale to the debtor.'
The Siemens Credit court held that Siemens was entitled to
a deficiency judgment subject to its ability at trial to rebut the
presumption that the equipment's fair market value was equal
to the amount of the outstanding debt.' The court additionally
held that Marvik was entitled to damages for the failure of notification.25 In so holding, the court combined the rebuttable presumption and setoff rules for what it felt was the best balance of
the competing interests of the debtor and creditor.26 The court
reasoned that while the chosen remedy should deter the secured
party from violating the statutory requirements of section 9504(3), the creditor should not be unfairly penalized, thereby rewarding the debtor.
the debtor is liable to the secured party for any deficiency resulting from a disposition of collateral after repossession. N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (McKinney 1990).
' The court later noted that Marvik was not harmed by the lack of notice since
the system was returned to Siemens with the understanding that it was to be sold.
Siemens Credit,859 F. Supp. at 693. In light of this fact, the court felt that application of the absolute bar rule would be unduly harsh to Siemens. Id.
2 Id.
at 691; see supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable notice
requirement of § 9-504(3)).
24 Siemens Credit,859 F. Supp. at
693.
2 id.
21 Id. at 692. The court began its discussion by noting that the New York Code
does not specifically provide a remedy for noncompliance with § 9-504(3) and that
the New York Court of Appeals has not yet addressed this gap in the Code. Id. at
691. The court, however, did mention that the Court of Appeals would likely allow a
debtor in Marvik's position to prove damages resulting from lack of notice because
the New York courts seek to protect the economic interests of those who do business
in the state. Id. at 693. In addition, the court cited to the Seventh Circuit's prediction that the New York Court of Appeals would adopt the rebuttable presumption
test. Id. at 692; see In re Excello Press Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 903 (7th Cir. 1989)
(applying New York law in bankruptcy appeal). The court also acknowledged the
split of authority among the New York Appellate Division Departments. Siemens
Credit, 859 F. Supp. at 691; see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text
(discussing split in New York). The court further stated that when determining
which of the three existing rules to apply, a court should attempt to balance the interests of the debtor and creditor in a manner which would protect the debtor, yet
be fair to the creditor. Id. at 690.
2 Id.
In rejecting the absolute bar approach, the Siemens Credit court felt that it
was disproportionately harsh to the secured party because it completely deprives
the secured party of money which it is rightfully owed, often because of a minor
oversight. Id.; see also Security Say. Bank v. Tranchitella, 592 A.2d 284, 285 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (explaining that "absolute bar" does not fairly balance
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In choosing to combine the rebuttable presumption and setoff rules, the court stated that "[u]nder this scheme, the secured
party does not lose the entire value of the deficiency ... , [yet is]
deter[red] ...from flouting the requirements of § 9-504(3). "28 In

addition, the court asserted that New York Code section 9-507(1)
is a "statutory embodiment and endorsement of the setoff
rule[;]" 29 thus, the rebuttable presumption and setoff rules
should be applied together. °
It is submitted that New York state courts faced with the
question of whether a noncomplying creditor under section 9504(3) is nonetheless entitled to a deficiency judgment should
follow the reasoning of the Siemens Credit court. The combination of the rebuttable presumption and setoff rules balances the
interests of both the debtor and creditor while furthering the
goals and policies of the New York Code.
Part I of this Article will trace the development of secured
transactions law in New York from the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act to the Uniform Commercial Code. Part II will describe
the three approaches currently employed by New York courts
and explain why the path taken by the Siemens Credit court is
the most equitable. Part III suggests an amendment to the New
York Code that would codify the approach taken by the Southern
District in Siemens Credit and eradicate the current split among
New York state courts. Such an amendment would establish a
rule which courts may apply uniformly and practitioners may
utilize to better serve their clients.

interests of parties). The Siemens Credit court explained that this approach results
in a windfall for the debtor because he is completely absolved of responsibility for
repayment of his obligation. Siemens Credit,859 F. Supp. at 692. The court also discounted the application of the setoff rule alone for the simple reason that "it does
not adequately protect the debtor's right to notification." Id. (citations omitted).
Siemens Credit, 859 F. Supp. at 692. The court noted the rebuttable presumption rule will force the secured party to bear the loss if the collateral is sold at below
market value, and the debtor will not have to pay any more than it would have paid
had proper notice been given. Id. The secured party will, in turn, be encouraged to
comply with the statutory requirements to avoid having to come forward with evidence to rebut the presumption that the fair market value of the collateral equals
the amount of the outstanding debt. Id.
Id. at 693.
3OId. at 693. In what perhaps may be the most important line of its decision, the
court explicitly states: "[A]doption of the rebuttable presumption rule does not preclude application of the setoff rule." Id.
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I. SECURED TRANSACTIONS LAW IN NEW YORK
A. The Development of Secured TransactionsLaw
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in
New York, the relationship between debtors and creditors was
governed by the Uniform Conditional Sales Act ("U.C.S.A.). 31
The requirements for repossession and subsequent disposition of
collateral under the U.C.S.A. were very rigid and explicit.32 Like
the current law, the seller was required to return to the buyer
any surplus from the sale and the buyer remained accountable to
the seller for any deficiency.33 The only provision in the old law
which dealt with a seller's noncompliance with the repossession
and disposition rules was section 80-e, which provided for actual
damages.' Despite this provision, case law held that if the resale was not conducted in strict compliance with the statutory
requirements, the seller was absolutely barred from recovering

3' The counterpart to present-day Part 5 of Article 9 was sections 76 to 80-e of the

U.C.S.A. Uniform Conditional Sales Act, ch. 642, §§ 60 to 80-j, [19221 N.Y. Laws
1766 (repealed 1964).
32 Generally speaking, the secured party was entitled to repossess
the collateral
upon the debtor's default. Id. § 76. Section 77 required the secured party to serve
upon the buyer a notice of intention to retake. Id. § 77. This placed the burden upon
the buyer to perform the obligations under the conditional sales agreement. Id.
Failure to do so allowed the seller to retake the goods. Id. Section 78 applied when
the seller did not serve such notice of intention upon the buyer and required the
seller in that instance to retain the goods for 10 days during which period the buyer
had the right to redeem the collateral. Id. § 78 [1922] N.Y. Laws 1766 (repealed
1964). Subject to some rigorous requirements contained in § 79, the secured party
could also resell the collateral in an attempt to recoup the outstanding balance of
the debt. Id. § 79. Section 79 noted that if the buyer did not redeem within the first
10 days after repossession, and the buyer had paid over 50% of the purchase price,
the seller was compelled to sell the collateral at a public sale. Id. If the buyer had
paid less than 50% of the price, § 80 allowed the parties to opt to resell the collateral. Id. § 80; see Snyder v. Guider, 17 Misc. 2d 558, 561, 185 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114-15
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1959) (describing method by which U.C.S.A. provided for resale of collateral upon debtor's default).
"'Uniform Conditional Sales Act, ch. 642, § 80-b, [1922] N.Y. Laws 1773 (repealed
1964) (giving seller right to recover deficiency judgment); cf N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(2)
(McKinney 1990).
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, ch. 642, § 80-e [1922] N.Y. Laws 1773 (repealed
1964) (providing that "buyer [could] recover from the seller his actual damages" resulting from such noncompliance); cf. N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (McKinney 1990); see
Squazzo v. Timken Silent Automatic Co., 249 A.D. 757, 291 N.Y.S. 945 (2d Dep't
1936) (acknowledging that buyer who has paid more than 50% of purchase price
when property is retaken by seller is entitled to damages under § 80-e).
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any deficiency."'
Many of the detailed requirements of the U.C.S.A. were
abolished by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
("Uniform Code") in 1964. The Uniform Code was heralded as "a
general and comprehensive revision of the state's existing laws
applicable to commercial transactions."" The Official Comment
to section 9-101 notes that the purpose of Article 9 is to create a
simple, uniform structure which would enable the complicated
financial transactions of the commercial world to be carried out
with "less cost and greater certainty."37 The goal of the disposition provisions of the Uniform Code is to maximize recovery from
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Goldstein, 25 A.D.2d 405, 407, 270 N.Y.S.
2d 261, 263 (1st Dep't 1966). In ManufacturersHanover, a conditional buyer purchased an air conditioner from a conditional vendor pursuant to a retail installment
contract and promissory note. Id. at 407, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 263. The conditional buyer
defaulted on his installment payments for March and April 1962, and the vendor
repossessed the air conditioner on May 22, 1962. Id. The vendor sold the air conditioner at a public sale on June I after having given the debtor notice on May 22. Id.
Citing § 78 of the U.S.C.A., the court noted that the vendor was required to hold
onto the repossessed goods for 10 days after the repossession in order to give the
buyer the chance to redeem. Id., 270 N.Y.S.2d at 264. Section 78 was interpreted to
mean that the sale could not occur until the 11th day, id. at 407, 270 N.Y.S.2d at
264, and since the sale occurred on the 10th day, it was not in compliance with § 78.
Id. Since the sale was not in compliance with the requirements of the statute, the
vendor was held to have lost his right to a deficiency judgment. Id. at 407, 270
N.Y.S.2d at 263; accord Warren-Joel Corp. v. Kirschenbaum, 57 Misc. 2d 451, 454,
292 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794 (Sup Ct. App. Term 1st Dep't 1968) (holding that seller's failure to give notice as required by § 78 precludes recovery of deficiency judgment from
buyer), affd, 31 A.D.2d 1005, 299 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1st Dep't 1969); see also Mott v.
Moldenhauer, 261 A.D. 724, 727, 27 N.Y.S.2d 563, 566 (3d Dep't) (holding that
seller's failure to give notice discharged buyer of any obligation under agreement),
appeal dismissed, 287 N.Y. 678, 39 N.E. 293 (1941); Leasco Computer, Inc. v. Sheridan Indus., 82 Misc. 2d 897, 900, 371 N.Y.S.2d 531, 533 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1975) (acknowledging that under U.C.S.A., failure to comply with § 79 discharged
buyer from any obligations under agreement). Other state courts have held that
strict compliance with the requirements of the U.C.S.A. is a condition precedent to
obtaining a deficiency judgment from the debtor. See, e.g., Rushton v. Shea, 423 F.
Supp. 468, 470-71 (D. Del. 1976); Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 32021 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Chittenden Trust Co. v. Maryanski, 415 A.2d 206, 210 (Vt.
1980).
" Leasco Computer, 82 Misc. 2d at 899, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 533 (citation omitted); see
also Edward S. Godfrey, Preview of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 ALB. L. REV.
22, 36 (1952) (noting that Article 9 is "much more than a codification of existing
law").
3' N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-101 Note at 291 (McKinney 1990); see also Page, supra note 11,
at 541 (discussing goal of flexibility within Code); Panel Discussion on the Uniform
Commercial Code: Report of the New York Law Revision Commission - Areas of Argument and Disagreement, 12 Bus. LAW. 49, 53 (1956) ("Article 9 attempts to provide flexibility and certainty now lacking.").
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the sale to benefit all persons involved. 8 A simple comparison of
the provisions of the U.C.S.A. with the provisions of Part 5 of
Article 9 demonstrates that much of the detailed and rigid requirements for resales have been replaced by more flexible, informal procedures. 9 For example, pursuant to section 79 of the
U.C.S.A., a seller had to concern itself with how much of the purchase price the buyer had already paid in determining whether
to conduct a private or public sale;4" in contrast, New York Code
section 9-504(3)'s only requirements are those of reasonable notification and commercially reasonable behavior.4 ' Under the
New York Code, the secured party is accorded much more flexibility in conducting its resale.
B. The Secured Party'sRight to Repossess and Dispose of
CollateralAfter Default
New York Code section 9-504(1) provides that a secured
party "may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the
collateral" upon the debtor's default.42 By choosing not to exercise this statutory right, the secured party has the option to seek
a judgment through judicial process and levy upon the debtor's
property.43 If the secured party opts to repossess the collateral,
section 9-504(2) requires that the secured party return any surplus to the debtor following the sale and makes the debtor accountable to the secured party for any deficiency." Section 9' FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 2.
33See Leasco Computer, 82 Misc. 2d at 899, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 533 (citing U.C.C.'s
elimination of U.S.C.A.'s requirement that buyer retain goods for 10 days); Conti
Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (N.J. Dist. Court Ocean County 1971)
(noting that U.C.C does not set forth specific time period when notice must be
given), affd, 288 A.2d 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
If the buyer had paid at least 50% of the purchase price then the seller would
have to conduct a public auction. Uniform Conditional Sales Act, ch. 642, § 79
[1922], N.Y. Laws 1766 (repealed 1964).
41 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (McKinney 1990).
N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (McKinney 1990).
4' N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-503 (McKinney 1990). If the secured party chooses to use judicial process, the situation will no longer be governed by the default provisions of
Article 9, but by any available procedure provided by state law. See S.M. Flickinger
Co. v. 18 Genesee Corp., 71 A.D.2d 382, 386, 423 N.Y.S.2d 73, 76 (4th Dep't 1979).
4 N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (McKinney 1990). A deficiency is "the difference between
the remaining indebtedness on the conditional sales contract plus incidental and
authorized expenses and the amount realized on a private sale of the [collateral]
following its repossession." General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc.,
79 A.D.2d 509, 509, 433 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1st Dep't 1980). The deficiency may include expenses of repossession, transfer, and storage of the collateral. See First City
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504(3) protects the debtor by placing limitations upon the secured party's resale of the repossessed collateral. 5 Not only
must the secured party send the debtor reasonable notice of the
sale, but every aspect of the disposition must be commercially
reasonable."
The notification requirement protects the debtor from unscrupulous creditors by allowing the debtor the opportunity either to participate in the sale or to redeem the collateral.47 The
Div. of Chase Lincoln First Bank, N.A. v. Vitale Lumber Co., Inc., 123 A.D.2d 207,
213, 510 N.Y.S.2d 766, 770 (3d Dep't 1987) (concluding that creditor's expenses were
"chargeable toward the deficiency").
N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (McKinney 1990). This section provides in pertinent part:
Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and
place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition including the
method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or
is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonablenotification of the
time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be
made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor ...."
Id. (emphasis added); see also JAMES WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 25-10, at 925 (4th ed 1995) ("The theory of notice is to give the
debtor an opportunity either to discharge the debt and redeem the collateral ... or to
see that the sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.").
46 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (McKinney 1990); see also supra
note 45 (providing
language of § 9-504(3)). The secured party is also constrained by § 1-203 which requires that it act in good faith. N.Y.U.C.C. §1-203 (McKinney 1990) ("Every contract
or duty within the Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."); see N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507 Official Comment at 577 (McKinney 1990)
(stating that principal limitation on secured party's right to dispose of collateral is
good faith); FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 142-43 ("Th[e duty of good faith
has been variously described as the duty to act to protect the debtor's interests as
well as the creditor's ... [and] to use best efforts to obtain the best price .... "). The
burden of proving compliance with the requirements of § 9-504(3) rests with the secured party. See European Am. Bank v. Kahn, 175 A.D.2d 704, 708, 573 N.Y.S.2d
274, 277 (1st Dep't 1991); Bancamerica Private Brands, Inc. v. Marine Gallery, Inc.,
157 A.D.2d 813, 550 N.Y.S.2d 720, 720-21 (2d Dep't 1990); FDIC v. Forte, 144
A.D.2d 627, 628, 535 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (2d Dep't 1988); Mack Fin. Corp. v. Knoud, 98
A.D.2d 713, 713-14, 469 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (2d Dep't 1983); see also FERRIS &
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 148 (noting burden of proving commercial reasonableness is on secured party in "overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions").
" Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Duranto Bros. & Sons, Inc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
804, 806 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens County 1978). The court in ChandlerLeasing wrote:
[The purpose of notice to the debtor of the sale of the collateral] is to enable
the debtor to protect his interest in the property by paying the debt, finding a buyer or being present at the sale ... to the end that [the property not
be] sacrificed by a sale at less than its true value.
Id.; see Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468, 469 (D. Del. 1976) (discussing purpose of
notice requirement); First Bank & Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 123 Misc. 2d 386, 393, 473
N.Y.S.2d 697, 702 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1984) ("All of the circumstances sur-
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debtor is strictly prohibited from waiving this right.48 Although
"reasonable notice" is not defined by the New York Code, notification prior to the sale which gives the debtor sufficient time to
protect its interest in the collateral is considered reasonable.4 9
Notice is unnecessary, however, if the "collateral is perishable or
threatens to decline speedily in value" or is sold on a recognized
market. 0 Absent these exceptions, notice is generally required
for the proper disposition of secured collateral.
The requirement that "every aspect of the disposition ...
must be commercially reasonable" further limits the secured
Since the term
party's right to resell the collateral.51
rounding the giving of notice must be evaluated in light of the purpose of the notice
requirement ... ."); see also Holt v. Peoples Bank, 814 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Ky. 1991)

(noting that it is not clear whether failure of secured party to act in commercially
reasonable manner requires denial of deficiency judgement); Franklin State Bank v.
Parker, 346 A.2d 632, 635 (N.J. Dist. Ct., Union County 1975) (stating commercially
reasonable conduct should be consistent with "prevailing trade practices"). For a description of the notice requirements see FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 3135; cf WHITE & SLUMMERS, supra note 45, at 925 (suggesting that rationale and

utility of notice requirement is dubious and that it leads to illogical result of letting
debtors escape from debts). See generally Maury B. Poscover, A Commercially Reasonable Sale Under Article 9: Commercial,Reasonable, and Fairto all Involved, 28
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 235, 238-41 (1994) (discussing Article 9 requirements of commercial reasonableness and notice). Section 9-506 establishes the debtor's right to redeem collateral. N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-506 (McKinney 1990) ("[Tlhe debtor ... may unless
otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral by tendering filfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral as well as the expenses reasonably
incurred by the secured party ...."). Since the right to redemption exists only before
disposition of the collateral, timely notification is extremely important. Fitzpatrick
v. Bank of N.Y., 125 Misc. 2d 1069, 1074, 480 N.Y.S.2d 864, 868 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
Queens County 1984).
4 N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-501(3) (McKinney 1990); see Mitchell, 123 Misc. 2d at 389, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 701 (refusing to recognize contractual provision waiving statutory notice); Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Watkins, 89 Misc. 2d 949, 951, 392 N.Y.S.2d
819, 821 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1977) (noting requirement of notice cannot be
"waived or varied"); accord C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 212 A.2d 436, 438 (Me. 1965)
(stating antecedent waiver of notification right is void as against public policy).
'9 See In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing reasonable notification).
ro N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (McKinney 1990); see, e.g., Chittenden Trust Co. v. Andre
Noel Sports, 621 A.2d 215, 218 (Vt. 1992) (noting that debtor does not need protection of notice under recognized market exception because "independent market
forces set the sale price which is presumptively commercially reasonable").
"' N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (McKinney 1990). The term "commercially reasonable" is
not defined in the New York Code. See FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 140.
Commercial reasonableness is a question of fact to be determined on a case by case
basis. Id.; see FDIC v. Forte, 144 A.D.2d 627, 628, 535 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (2d Dep't
1988). In Forte, the court concluded that the sale was not commercially reasonable
on the basis of three factors: (1) the actual circumstances surrounding the sale; (2)
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"commercially reasonable" is not explicitly defined in the New
York Code, courts have established two tests to determine compliance with this statutory requirement:" (1) the "procedures
test," which focuses on the specific procedures used in an attempt to obtain a fair price; 3 and (2) the "proceeds test," which
requires the secured party to act in a manner which will obtain
the highest possible price.54 The plain language of section 9507(2) seems to support the procedures test: "[T]he fact that a
better price could have been obtained ... is not of itself sufficient
the fact that a year had elapsed between foreclosure; and (3) the substantial discrepancy between the sale price and the fair market value of the property. Id. Another jurisdiction has noted that evidence which would demonstrate commercial
reasonableness includes "the amount of advertising done, the number of people contacted, normal commercial practices in disposing of the particular collateral, the
length of time between the repossession and the sale, whether any deterioration in
the collateral has occurred, the number of bids received, and the price obtained."
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Incendy, 540 A.2d 32, 39 (Conn. 1988); see also
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc., 79 A.D.2d 509, 510, 433
N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (1st Dep't 1980) (concluding that secured party's failure to inspect
equipment or acknowledge its special option features was commercially unreasonable).
52 See Kohler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Inc., 93 A.D.2d
205, 208, 462 N.Y.S.2d 297,
300 (3d Dep't 1983) (noting courts are split on whether commercial reasonableness
"turns on the actual procedures employed or whether the prime objective is optimizing the resale price"); see also In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 905-06 (7th
Cir. 1989) (discussing two approaches to commercial reasonableness); Bankers
Trust Co. v. J. V. Dowler & Co., Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 128, 135, 390 N.E.2d 766, 769, 417
N.Y.S.2d 47, 51 (1979) (comparing test which focuses on price with one that focuses
on procedure). Article 9 also identifies several general indicators of commercial reasonableness. N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (McKinney 1990). The listed indicators of commercial reasonableness are not, however, "to be regarded as either required or
exclusive." N.Y.U.C.C. §9-507 Official Comment 2, at 578 (McKinney 1990); see also
9A RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 9-507:3
(1994 Revision of Vol. 9) (suggesting that object of Code and commercial reasonableness requirement is to "encourage the making of the most advantageous sale in order to reduce the deficiency for which the debtor is liable.").
See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. First Tenn. Bank, N.A., 826 F.2d 434, 439 (6th
Cir. 1987) ("A commercially reasonable sale is tested by the procedures employed for
sale rather than the proceeds received."); Franklin State Bank v. Parker, 346 A.2d
632, 635 (N.J. Super. 1975) (noting that seller should have at least made casual inspection of automobile before reselling it to determine why it did not operate); FDIC
v. Herald Square Fabrics Corp., 81 A.D.2d 168, 184, 439 N.Y.S.2d 944, 954 (2d Dep't
1981) (discussing procedures test); see also FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at
152-53 (stating that procedures test is most frequently used, but proceeds test is
also available).
See, e.g., John Deere Indus. Equip. Co. v. Triple Cities Equip., Inc., 646 F. Supp.
114, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 1986); HeraldSquare Fabrics,81 A.D.2d at 184, 439 N.Y.S.2d at
954; see also FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 153 (indicating that courts that
treat price as "key component" in deciding commercial reasonableness are employing proceeds test).
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to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially reasonable manner.""5 Under either formulation, a substantial discrepancy between the original purchase price and the disposition
price will invite closer scrutiny by the court.56 Apart from considering the resale price, commercial reasonableness requires
that the secured party make a timely disposition of the collateral
after repossession."
In order to facilitate determination of this fact-intensive issue, section 9-507(2) establishes situations in which a disposition
will be considered commercially reasonable: (1) when the secured
party sells the collateral in a recognized market; (2) when the secured party sells in conformity with reasonable commercial
practices among dealers in the type of collateral being sold; or (3)
when it sells in a disposition which has been approved in a judicial proceeding. 8 These situations are neither exclusive nor required, so long as the secured party can in fact establish

r N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(2). In In re Zsa Zsa Ltd., 352 F. Supp. 665, 671 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), affd, 475 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), the court stated that:
The language of section 9-507 reveals that the primary focus of commercial
reasonableness is not the proceeds received from the sale but rather the
procedures employed for the sale. If the secured creditor makes certain
that conditions of the sale, in terms of the aggregate effect of the manner,
method, time, place and terms employed conform to commercially accepted
standards, he should be shielded from the sanctions contained in Article 9.
See, e.g., FDIC v. Forte, 144 A.D.2d 627, 628, 535 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (2d Dep't
1988); First Bank Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 123 Misc. 2d 386, 395, 473 N.Y.S.2d 697,
703 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins County 1984); see also FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4,
at 153 (noting that low price alone is not enough to show commercial unreasonableness, but discrepancies between sale price and market value invite closer scrutiny).
" "[T]here should be no undue delay between the time of repossession and the
time of disposition, and ... any delay which does occur should be justifiable." FERRIS
& GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 191; see also Forte, 144 A.D.2d at 628, 535 N.Y.S.2d
at 77 (inquiring further into sale which occurred over year after repossession). A
justifiable delay would be one which maximizes the price recovered at the sale.
Fletcher v. Cobuzzi, 499 F. Supp. 694, 700 (W.D. Pa. 1980). In addition, the fact that
extensive planning and preparation are required to prepare the goods for sale can
render the delay justifiable. FERRIS & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 192-93. In contrast, if the property would depreciate quickly, like a computer, it may be more important to sell the property quickly. Id. at 193.
rs N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (McKinney 1990); see, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. G.F. Clear,
Inc., 93 A.D.2d 925, 926, 462 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329 (3d Dep't 1983) (holding that sale
was commercially reasonable when conducted according to auctioneer's usual practices); Forte, 144 A.D.2d at 630, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (noting
that sale is commercially reasonable if it has judicial approval). When the disposition is approved in a judicial proceeding, it is conclusively deemed to be commercially reasonable. N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (McKinney 1990).
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commercial reasonableness.59
C. Secured Party'sNoncompliance with Section 9-504(3)
A secured party fails to comply with section 9-504(3) in two
instances: (1) by failing to give reasonable notification60 and (2)
by failing to conduct a commercially reasonable sale.61
Section 9-507(1) is the only provision in Article 9 that addresses the secured party's failure to comply with the statutory
requirements. 2 It simply provides that disposition may be
"ordered or restrained[;]" if disposition has already occurred, the
debtor has the right to recover from the secured party "any loss
caused by" the noncompliance. 3 Courts place the burden of
proving compliance upon the secured creditor.'
The split among courts regarding the effect of noncompliance upon the creditor's right to a deficiency judgment stems
from the differing interpretations of the interplay between sections 9-504 and 9-507.5 In addition to disagreeing with respect
See N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507 Official Comment 2 at 578 (McKinney 1990).
ro N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (requiring reasonable notification); see Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. H & H Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge, Inc., 927 F.2d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that creditor's failure to give "reasonable notification" of sale rendered
sale commercially unreasonable).
61See N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (requiring all aspects of dispositions to be
commercially reasonable); see, e.g., Forte, 144 A.D.2d at 629, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 77 (concluding
circumstances surrounding sale were commercially reasonable because of time lapse
between foreclosure and sale, as well as price discrepancy).
N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (McKinney 1990); see In re Replogle, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 1048, 1052 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) ("The U.C.C., however, contains
no provision dealing with the effect of a commercially unreasonable disposition upon
the secured party's right to recover a deficiency."), rev'd on other grounds, 929 F.2d
836 (1st Cir. 1991); Associates Fin. Servs. Co., Inc. v. DiMarco, 383 A.2d 296, 302
(Del. 1978) (noting that New York Code draftsmen did not directly face question of
nonconforming sale and noting split in jurisdiction as to allowance of deficiency
judgment); see also 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 44.9.10 at 1253 (1965) (suggesting omission was an oversight and that secured creditor's misconduct has no effect on deficiency claim).
N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (McKinney 1990).
"See In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1989) ("New York
courts ... say that compliance with § 9-504(3) is part of the creditor's proof in a deficiency action.").
6' Many courts hold that noncompliance on the part of the creditor creates a bar to
a deficiency judgment. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing absolute bar rule). Others apply § 9-507(1) as the sole remedy available to the debtor.
See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (discussing setoff rule). Still other
courts construct a "rebuttable presumption" as to the value of the collateral when
faced with creditor noncompliance. See infra 95-107 and accompanying text
(discussing rebuttable presumption rule).
'9
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to the interaction of the applicable New York Code sections,
some courts also apply different rules depending on whether
noncompliance stems from lack of notice or a commercially unreasonable sale.66 This distinction seems counterintuitive; lack
of reasonable notification should result in a finding that the secured creditor did not act in a commercially reasonable manner.
By collapsing reasonable notification into "commercial reasonableness," courts may find compliance with section 9-504(3), despite the lack of notice, if the overall circumstances surrounding
the sale were commercially reasonable.68 Rather than making
c6 See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Unique Structures, Inc., 49 F.3d 1330, 1333 n.3 (8th
Cir. 1995) (noting that Arkansas applied absolute bar rule in lack of notice cases and
rebuttable presumption rule in commercially unreasonable sale cases); In re Excello
Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that New York would use
"middle-of-the-road" position between absolute bar and no effect on creditor's claim);
Roc-Century Assoc. v. Giunta, 658 A.2d 223, 226 (Me. 1995) (applying absolute bar
rule when faced with lack of notice and rebuttable presumption rule when faced
with commercially unreasonable sale); Ruden v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 638
A.2d 1225, 1234 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (noting trend in some courts to make distinction between no-notice cases and other commercially unreasonable behavior),
cert. denied, 677 A.2d 445 (1994). But cf Wanda M. Temm, CreditorBeware: From
Default Through Deficiency Judgment, 60 J. KAN. B.A. 17 (Oct. 1991) (noting that
Kansas utilizes absolute bar rule for creditor misbehavior in consumer transactions
and rebuttable presumption rule in commercial transactions).
67 See Topeka Datsun Motor Co. v. Stratton, 736 P.2d 82, 86 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that "[clommercial reasonableness is an umbrella term which encompasses
all aspects of the sale including the notice given .... "); United States v. Willis, 593
F.2d 247, 256 (6th Cir. 1979). The court stated in Willis:'
This distinction is without legal significance. The crucial question under
consideration concerns "commercial reasonableness"; this remains so
whether the factual context in which the issue is presented focuses upon
proper notification prior to sale or the manner in which the sale is actually
consummated .... this requirement must be satisfied whether the facts involve a commercially reasonable notice prior to sale, or the commercial
reasonableness of the sale itself.
Id.; see also Hoch v. Ellis, 627 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Alaska 1981) (noting that rebuttable
presumption rule applies to cases in which sale was deficient in respect to either
notification or commercial reasonableness of sale); Associates Capital Servs. Corp. v.
Riccardi, 408 A.2d 930, 932 (R.I. 1979) (rejecting absolute bar to deficiency judgements as against Uniform Code's policy of fairness). See generally David Lance
Swanson, Note, The Disposition of Repossessed Collateral in Tennessee: Notice,
Commercial Reasonableness, and Deficiency Judgments, 16 MEM. ST. U. L. REV.
375, 389-94 (1986) (discussing factors, including notice, that affect commercial reasonableness standard). But see id. at 377 n.10-11 and accompanying text (indicating
that at least one commentator believes commercial reasonableness and notification
are distinct and exclusive concepts) (citing Douglas M. Mancino, Note, Denial of Deficiency: A Problem of Reasonable Notice Under UCC § 9-504(3), 34 OHIO ST. L.J.
657, 666 (1973)).
6See Swanson, supra note 67, at 379 (stating that interrelatedness of notice and
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the rules unduly complex and requiring different tests for different situations, the distinction should simply be reflected in the
amount of damages the debtor is entitled to under section 9507(1). For example, if the debtor can prove that it was able to
redeem the collateral had notice been given, a debtor's damages
should be increased accordingly. "

II. APPROACHES TAKEN BY NEW YORK COURTS
A. Absolute Bar
The Second Department regards the secured party's compliance with section 9-504(3) as a condition precedent to the secured creditor's ability to obtain a deficiency judgment." Many
commercial reasonableness permits "judicial discretion to find a given sale commercially reasonable even in the absence of compliance with the notice provision"). This
reasoning can also work in the reverse, allowing a court to consider an otherwise
reasonable sale to be unreasonable due to the lack of notice. See Woodward v. Resource Bank, 436 S.E.2d 613, 617 (Va. 1993) (holding that secured party did not
meet burden of proving compliance with statute because failure to give notice made
sale commercially unreasonable); see also In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 905
(7th Cir. 1989) ("Failure to give notice is evidence of commercially unreasonable behavior.").
'9 But see Holt v. Peoples Bank, 814 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1991) (asserting that
without notice debtor cannot redeem). The Holt court felt that such behavior on the
part of a secured party is so egregious as to justify an absolute bar to the creditor
recovering a deficiency judgment.
70 See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (discussing
pre-Code law under
U.C.S.A.). Courts adopting this approach consider the interpretation of the U.C.S.A.
as not being displaced by the New York Code provisions. Thus, as in pre-Code law,
the noncomplying creditor forfeits his right to a deficiency judgment. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13,
15 (N.Y. Civil Ct. N.Y. County 1971); e.g., Central Budget Corp. v. Garrett, 48
A.D.2d 825, 826. 368 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (2d Dep't 1975); Long Island Bank v. Knight,
122 Misc. 2d 878, 878, 473 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 2d Dep't 1983);
Avis-Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Franklin, 82 Misc. 2d 66, 67, 366 N.Y.S.2d 83, 85 (Sup.
Ct. App. Term 2d Dep't 1975); Chandler Leasing Corp. v. Durante Bros. & Sons,
Inc., 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 804, 807 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1978); accord Security Pacific Nat-l Bank v. Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 1990);
Peoples Bank v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 1544, 1546 (11th Cir. 1986); Nixdorf Computer,
Inc. v. Jet Forwarding, Inc., 579 F.2d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 1978); Atlas Thrift Co. v.
Horan, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (citing Leasco Data case with
approval); Chittenden Trust Co. v. Andre Noel Sports, 621 A.2d 215, 220 (Vt. 1992);
see also Elizabeth Dalton, Note, The Consequences of Commercially Unreasonable
Dispositions of Collateral:Haggis Management, Inc. v. Turtle Management, Inc.,
1986 UTAH L. REV. 813, 816 (recognizing that one of four rationales posited to support application of absolute bar rule is reliance upon pre-Code decisions). But see
Norma G. Formanek, Comment, The CaliforniaArticle 9 No-Deficiency Rule: Undermining the Secured Party's Security, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 163-68 (1982)
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states in which the Uniform Conditional Sales Act preceded the
Uniform Commercial Code adopted this principle." The aim of
this approach is to deter noncompliance by the secured creditor:72
(criticizing California Appellate Court's reliance in Atlas Thrift upon pre-U.C.C.
common law because § 1-103 does not authorize resort to pre-U.C.C. law).
The New York Appellate Division, Second Department, adopted this approach
in Leasco Data ProcessingEquipment, Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089,
1093, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 19 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), holding that the secured
party forfeited the right to a deficiency judgment because of the failure to comply
with the statute by notifying the debtor of the time of the sale. Leasco Data involved
a leasing agreement between the plaintiff corporation and defendant company for
certain equipment. Id. at 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The debtor's default caused acceleration of the remaining balance and lawful repossession of the equipment. Id.
Upon subsequent disposition of the collateral, the fair market value of the property
was received but the creditor failed to notify the debtor of the time of the sale as required by § 9-504(3). Id. at 1090, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The secured party sought a deficiency judgment for the amount of the debt not realized by the proceeds from the
sale. Id.
The court relied on three reasons for adopting the absolute bar rule. First, the
court noted that the drafters of the New York Code did not expressly manifest an
intention to change pre-Code law, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Id. at 1090,
323 N.Y.S.2d at 15 ("If the authors of the Uniform Commercial Code proposed to
overthrow the firmly established and generally accepted construction of the older
statute ... they surely would have manifested that intent in clear and unambiguous
language."). Second, turning to a textual analysis of New York Code § 9-504, the
court reasoned that since the section contained both the commercial reasonableness
and notice requirements without stating they were independent of each other, the
provisions must be read as interrelated. Id. at 1091, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 16. Third, the
court asserted that § 9-507(1) was not a defense to a deficiency judgment action;
rather, it is an affirmative action enabling the debtor to recover damages caused by
the secured party's noncompliance. Id. at 1092, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The court
stated:
If [9-507] were intended to authorize a defense to an action for a deficiency
judgment, it is hard to envisage language less apt to that purpose. The
words used plainly contemplate an affirmative action to recover for a loss
that has already been sustained - not a defense to an action for a deficiency.
Id. The court's final words epitomize the thrust of the absolute bar approach: "The
burden on the secured creditor is by no means onerous. If he wishes a deficiency
judgment he must obey the law .... If he does not obey the law he may not secure a
deficiency judgment." Id. at 1093, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
", See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Carter, 511 F.2d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1975); Atlas
Thrift Co., 104 Cal. Rptr. at 318 (citing pre-Code California law); Wilmington Trust
Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 777 (Del. 1980) (noting that under U.C.S.A., strict
compliance with notice requirement was condition precedent to collecting deficiency
judgment); C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 212 A.2d 436, 439 (Me. 1965); Frantz Equip. Co.
v. Anderson, 181 A.2d 499, 505 (N.J. 1962).
' See Terry M. Anderson, Noncomplying Secured Creditors, Deficiency Judgments, and Implied Satisfactions Under the Nebraska Uniform Commercial Code,
26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 15 (1992). "If the primary [goal] ... is to compel secured
creditor compliance ... , then obviously the absolute bar rule works best. If the consequence of every breach is denial of a deficiency, then creditors will be careful in-
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what better way to encourage creditors to follow the mandate of
the statute than to threaten their right to recover monies not received in the disposition of the collateral? Courts and commentators have proffered various reasons supporting the absolute
bar approach." One commentator noted that in light of the
"minimum formal requirements"74 that now are contained in the
New York Code, the conclusion to bar absolutely a deficiency
judgment is more reasonable than under pre-Code law.75 Andeed." Id.
73 For example, in Credit CarLeasing Corp. v. DeCresenzo, 138 Misc. 2d 726, 733,
525 N.Y.S.2d 492, 497 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1988), the New York Civil Court
noted that the absolute bar rule was sound because "[t]he burden on the creditor to
comply with the notice provision is minimal in light of the benefit to the debtor's
ability to protect his or her interest in the collateral." See Formanek, supra note 70,
at 159 (stating that "secured party should not be allowed to recover a benefit from
his or her wrong"); William B. Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U. L. REV. 265, 300
(1978) (describing no-deficiency rule as "judicially created penalty"). At least one
commentator has stated that secured parties consistently do not attempt to maximize the price received at the sale to benefit both the debtor and creditor. See Philip
Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and
Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 26-28 (1969). Professor Shuchman discusses several
cases in which the secured creditors' repossession and resale of cars for almost less
than half value caused the courts to conclude that the absolute bar rule was the correct approach. Id. But see In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1989).
The Seventh Circuit noted that secured parties have no reason not to maximize the
price received at resale. Id. The court reasoned that a secured party would want to
take advantage of receiving the dollar today rather than having to enforce a deficiency tomorrow. Id.
74 The Vermont Supreme Court in Chittenden Trust Co., 621 A.2d at 215, 218-19,
noted that it is not unreasonable to require compliance with the notice requirement
by the secured party because it is one of the few requirements of its kind in the Uniform Code. But see Woodward v. Resource Bank, 436 S.E.2d 613, 617 (Va. 1993)
(refusing to adopt absolute bar rule because it was "unduly harsh and punitive");
Edward J. Heiser, Jr. & Robert J. Flemma, Jr., Consumer Issues in the Article 9 Revision Project: The Perspective of Consumer Lenders, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
488, 491-92 (1994) (articulating that consumer creditor group opposes antideficiency rule because it is "punitive ... [with] no place in the UCC," provides debtors with incentives to abuse law by "look[ing] for technical violations ... [which have
no] adverse impact on the debtor," and that it relegates secured creditor to worse
position than unsecured creditor contrary to UCC purpose).
'5 See 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1264, §
44.9.4 (1965). In choosing the absolute bar approach as the most reasonable, Gilmore referred to Judge Willson's opinion in Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963), vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.
1964). In Skeels, the secured party failed to give the debtor notice of the sale of his
collateral. Id. at 696. The court held that allowing "recovery by the security holder
of a loss in disposing of collateral when no notice has been given, permits a continuation of the evil which the Commercial Code sought to correct .... It was the secret disposition of collateral by chattel mortgage owners and others which was [the]
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other rationale for the approach uses section 1-103 of the New
York Code, which provides that unless otherwise displaced by
the particular section of the New York Code, pre-Code law shall
supplement the New York Code provisions.76
There are several defects in the reasoning employed by
courts following the absolute bar rule. First, section 9-101 of the
New York Code notes the intention of the drafters to replace the
common law.77 Second, both the New York Code and the Uniform Code policies discourage punitive damages.78 Moreover, the
evil..."Id. at 702.
It is worth noting that most of the courts which impose the absolute bar rule
upon misbehaving creditors are faced with cases involving lack of notice. As the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated, "[tihe greatest protection available to debtors from
unscrupulous conduct by secured parties who have repossessed collateral is notice of
disposition of the collateral." Holt v. Peoples Bank, 814 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1991).
Often, when faced with a commercially unreasonable sale, the same court which
when confronted with lack of notice applied the absolute bar rule, will now apply the
rebuttable presumption rule. Compare One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 5 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 792 (1968) (lack of notice barred deficiency judgment) with
First Agricultural Bank v. Replogle, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1048 (1989)
(applying rebuttable presumption rule due to commercially unreasonable sale). It is
submitted that this is a result that derives from the misconception that notice and
commercial reasonableness are two separate and distinct concepts. It is further
submitted that courts should apply the same test regardless of which portion of the
statute is violated.
N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-103 (McKinney 1990) provides that:
[Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating
cause shall supplement its provisions.
Id.; see Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 104 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)
(allowing pre-Code California law to supplement Code sections pertaining to default,
thus barring noncomplying creditor from obtaining deficiency judgment); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Conner, 415 A.2d 773, 779 (Del. 1980) (applying pre-Code Delaware
law to deny deficiency judgment); Chittenden Trust Co. v. Andre Noel Sports, 621
A.2d 215, 220 (Vt. 1992) (citing § 1-103 as reason for applying absolute bar rule).
77N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Comment at 290 (McKinney 1990). This section
notes that "[the Code] supersedes prior legislation dealing with ... conditional sales
...." In addition, Official Comment 2 to § 9-504 explicitly notes that subsection (1)
was intended to follow prior law. N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-504 Official Comment 2, at 554
(McKinney 1990). It is reasonable to assume that the drafters would have explicitly
indicated their intention to interpret subsections (2) and (3) consonant with prior
law. Thus, the argument furthered by the court in Leasco Data, that the New York
Code did not change the common law in New York, is without merit. See supra note
70 (discussing rationale of Leasco Datacourt).
78 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-106 (McKinney 1990) ("[N]either
consequential or special
nor penal damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act .... )
(emphasis added). Even courts which adopt the absolute bar rule must concede that
the absolute bar rule is not specifically provided for in the Code and that employing
7
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blanket imposition of an absolute bar upon a secured creditor
could have very harsh consequences in certain circumstances.79
For example, two different creditors, one owed a deficiency of one
million dollars and the other a deficiency of one hundred dollars,
could each make the same error, yet one would be penalized
more harshly than the other. 0 Advocates of the absolute bar approach seem to give little thought to the rights of the secured
party.8 One court eloquently stated: "[The spirit of commercial
reasonableness requires that the secured party not be arbitrarily
deprived of his deficiency.... ,2 Since the absolute bar rule often
arbitrarily deprives creditors of the deficiency, it clearly does not
comport with the policies of the New York and Uniform Codes
and should not be followed.
B. Setoff Rule
The New York Appellate Division, Third Department, is
among the minority of courts that employ the "setoff rule."' This
rule rejects the automatic denial of a deficiency judgment and
instead limits the debtor's remedies to those granted in section
such a rule is akin to imposing punitive damages upon the secured creditor. See
Bank of Chapmanville v. Workman, 406 S.E.2d 58, 64 (W. Va. 1991) (calling absolute bar rule "judge-made punitive provision"). An additional argument against the
absolute bar rule is that it "involves a forfeiture, and the law generally disfavors forfeitures." Id. at 64.
7' See

id.

so Id.
"' See Formanek, supra note 70, at 174. The author asserts that in a typical secured transaction, the secured creditor assumes the risk that the debtor will default. Id. The security interest is supposed to protect the debtor from such a risk,
but often the collateral has declined in value. Id. The purpose of the deficiency
judgment is to compensate the secured party for the decreased value of the property
which secures the debt. Id.
Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (N.J. Super. 1971), affd, 288
A.2d 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972); see Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. Coyne, 537
A.2d 798, 803 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (stating that appropriate manner to
deal with problem is "doing justice to both parties"); see also Security Sav. Bank v.
Tranchitella, 592 A.2d 284, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (stating that
"[tihere is no reason why a debtor should receive a windfall" because it is
"appropriate [to] recogni[ze] ... the legitimate interests of both parties") (emphasis
added).
" See, e.g., Stanchi v. Kemp, 48 A.D.2d 973, 974, 370 N.Y.S.2d 26, 28 (3d Dep't
1975) (noting that failure of secured creditor to comply with § 9-504 would not discharge debtor from all liability under contract); Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Howard, 75 Misc. 2d 181, 182, 347 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308 (Rochester City Ct. 1973) (holding
that § 9-507(1) establishes penalties for noncompliance); see also Formanek, supra
note 70, at 160 (describing setoff rule).
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9-507(1). 84 Under section 9-507(1), the debtor is required to affirmatively prove that he was injured by a creditor's lack of notice or commercially unreasonable behavior.' Thus, the secured
party is always entitled to a deficiency judgment reduced by the
amount of damages the debtor is able to prove.8" The policy behind this approach is to compensate the debtor for the damages
Section 9-507(1) allows
caused by the creditor's misbehavior.'
of
each
case,
and thus to equitably
to
"reach
the
merits"
the court
measure the damages to the debtor in terms of the harm caused
by the noncompliance.'
84 See 9A RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
643-46 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1995) (explaining setoff approach including situations
where such approach could apply); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1252 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (examining case law
support for setoff approach as well as consequences of using this approach in deciding deficiency judgments); Formanek, supra note 70, at 160 ([Tihe debtor's remedies are limitied to those provided in section 9-507(1): an affirmative suit against
the secured party for damages, or setoff or couterclaim in the secured party's suit
for a deficiency judgment."); Page, supra note 11, at 535 (noting that damages are
limited under setoff approach to those set forth in § 9-507(1)).
N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (McKinney 1990) provides:
If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in accordance
with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered or restrained on
appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred the
debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose security interest has
been made known to the secured party prior to the disposition has a right
to recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply
with the provisions of this Part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the
debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the
credit service charge plus ten per cent of the principal amount of the debt
or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash price.
Id.
6' In Leasco Computer, Inc. v. SheridanIndus., 82 Misc. 2d 897, 900, 371 N.Y.S.2d
531, 534 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1975), the New York Civil Court directly contradicted Judge Sandler's decision in Leasco Data ProcessingEquip. Corp. v. Atlas
Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1975). The
Leasco Computer court held that the debtor's exclusive remedy for noncompliance by
a secured creditor is found in § 9-507(1). Leasco Computer, 82 Misc. 2d at 899-900,
371 N.Y.S.2d at 533-34; see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Lyon Air, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1121 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) (holding that § 9-507 does not
absolve debtor of all liability when creditor fails to comply with § 9-504). Rejecting
Judge Sandler's contention in Leasco Data that the New York Code did not change
the law as it was under the U.C.S.A., Judge Okin emphasized the elimination of the
detailed requirements of the former law. Leasco Computer, 82 Misc. 2d at 900, 371
N.Y.S.2d at 534. Accordingly, the court asserted that it was the burden of the buyer
(or debtor) to show the loss caused by a failure to comply with the statute. Id.
87 See Dalton, supra note 70, at 819 ("The aim of this approach is to compensate
the debtor for actual damages suffered because of creditor noncompliance.").
's See Formanek, supra note 70, at 160 (noting that setoff approach allows courts
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The reasoning most often asserted in support of the setoff
approach is that it is expressly provided for in the New York
Code, indicating that a complete bar was not intended and that
section 9-507 is the exclusive remedy.89 Because the New York
Code is otherwise silent as to the ramifications of creditor noncompliance, advocates argue that section 9-507 must have been
intended to occupy the field.9" The problem inherent in this approach is that it places the burden of proving damages upon the
debtor, often the party least able to prove such damages.91 In
many situations, if the debtor has not received notice of the sale,
it is very difficult to prove that the fair market value of the property was greater than the amount received from the repossession
sale.92 In some situations, the debtor may not be damaged at
all. 3 In addition, this approach may encourage noncompliance
to measure damages caused by noncompliance because courts will "reach the merits" of every case); Page, supra note 11, at 539 (explaining how § 9-507 explicitly
provides that damages be available to debtor based upon creditor's noncompliance).
"9See Barbour v. United States, 562 F.2d 19, 21 (10th Cir. 1977) (limiting debtors
recovery to that expressly provided for in § 9-507(1)); see also Dalton, supra note 70,
at 819 (noting that since Code does not deny deficiency judgments under § 9-504(3),
under setoff approach § 9-507(1) serves as debtor's only remedy); Formanek, supra
note 70, at 166-67. Advocates of this approach assert that by incorporating the section caption ("Secured Party's Liability for Failure to Comply with this Part") into
the substantive content of § 9-507, it is clear that the section was intended to provide a comprehensive listing of the debtor's remedies in the event of the secured
party's noncompliance. Id.
9 See Formanek, supra note 70, at 159-60 (reporting on group of courts that limit
debtor's remedies to those provided in § 9-507(1)). But see Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp. v. Atlas Shirt Co., Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 1089, 1092, 323 N.Y.S.2d 13, 16
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971) (asserting that § 9-507 contemplates only affirmative actions to recover losses sustained due to creditor noncompliance).
9' See Robert M. Lloyd, The Absolute Bar Rule in UCC Foreclosure Sale: A Prescription for Waste, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 695, 723 (1993) (stating that problems with
setoff rule are "so widely recognized that courts seldom apply the ... rule anymore").
92 See Bank of Chapmanville v. Workman, 406 S.E.2d 58,
65 (W. Va. 1991). The
Chapmanville court drew the following analogy:
[T]he debtor may be in a position similar to that of a surgery patient who
has difficulty knowing what went wrong in the operating room, either because he does not understand what was being done to him on the operating
table, or because he lay unconscious under a general anesthetic during the
surgery. Like the surgery patient, the debtor may have trouble determining, much less proving, what went wrong at a commercially unreasonable
sale. This is especially true for the debtor who is not present at the sale, for
he is like the surgery patient who is unconscious during the operation.
Id.; see also Lloyd, supra note 91, at 723 (maintaining that facts necessary to prove
damages are "much more readily available to the secured party than they are to the
debtor").
9' For example, suppose that the debtor owes the secured party $10,000 upon de-
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on the part of the secured party because if the creditor can foresee the debtor incurring minimal or no damages, the creditor can
make a business judgment and decide to conduct the sale in the
manner of his choosing, absorbing the debtor's minimal damages
as an expense of doing business.94 This result would clearly contravene the New York Code's objective of protecting debtors from
dishonest creditors.
C. Rebuttable PresumptionRule

Dissatisfied with the results of both the absolute bar and
setoff rules, the First and Fourth Departments have adopted the
rebuttable presumption approach.9 5 Under this rule, the secured
party is not prohibited from recovering a deficiency judgment.96
fault and at repossession the collateral has a fair market value of $8,000. Suppose
further that the secured party resells the collateral, without notice to the debtor,
and receives $8,000. In this hypothetical, the debtor can recover no damages under §
9-507(1) because the debtor is not actually damaged. Formanek, supra note 70, at
173-74.
04 Indeed, § 9-507(1) is designed to protect other creditors as well as the debtor.
The Official Comment states "it is vital both to the debtor and other creditors to
provide a remedy for the failure [of the secured creditor] to comply with the statutory duty." N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-507 Official Comment 1, at 577 (McKinney 1990).
See, e.g., Telmark, Inc. v. Lavigne, 124 A.D.2d 1055, 1055, 508 N.Y.S.2d 737,
738 (4th Dep't 1986) (applying rebuttable presumption rule in granting partial
summary judgment to secured creditor); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Durante
Bros. & Sons, 79 A.D.2d 509, 510-11, 433 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577 (1st Dep't 1980)
(granting creditor deficiency judgment on basis of rebuttable presumption rule);
S.M. Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genesee Corp., 71 A.D.2d 382, 385, 423 N.Y.S.2d 73, 76
(4th Dep't 1979) (noting that rebuttable presumption rule applies and therefore
creditor may receive deficiency judgment); Security Trust Co. v. Thomas, 59 A.D.2d
242, 246-47, 399 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (4th Dep't 1977) (adopting rebuttable presumption rule as applicable under New York law). The rebuttable presumption rule is
sometimes referred to as the "Arkansas Rule" in recognition of the first case to
adopt this approach, Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 398 S.W.2d 538 (Ark.
1966). The Norton court asserted that by failing to give notice the secured party
makes it difficult for the debtor to prove the extent of his loss and that 'the just solution is to indulge the presumption in the first instance that the collateral was
worth at least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to the creditor the burden of
proving the amount that should reasonably have been obtained through a sale conducted according to law." Id. at 542; see also Universal C.I.T. Credit Co. v. Rone, 453
S.W.2d 37, 41 (Ark. 1970) (adopting rebuttable presumption rule).
See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Mitchell, 94 A.D.2d 971, 971, 464 N.Y.S.2d 96,
97 (4th Dep't 1983) (holding that failure to comply does not preclude secured creditor from receiving deficiency judgment); S.M. Flickinger Co., 71 A.D.2d at 385, 423
N.Y.S.2d at 76 (holding that under rebuttable presumption rule noncompliance does
not deprive plaintiff/creditor of deficiency judgment); see also Paco Corp. v. Vigliarola, 611 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); ANDERSON, supra note 84, at 640-43
(discussing rebuttable presumption rule).
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If the debtor alleges noncompliance with section 9-504(3), a rebuttable presumption arises, in favor of the debtor, that the repossessed collateral had a fair market value equal to the
outstanding debt.9 7 In order to rebut this presumption, the secured party must come forward with evidence suggesting "the
reasonable amount the collateral would get at a proper sale."98
Unless the secured party rebuts this presumption, the debtor
owes no deficiency. 9 Under this approach, despite acting in a
commercially unreasonable manner, if the secured party can
prove that the fair market value of the collateral was less than
the outstanding
debt, the court will issue a deficiency judg100
ment.
Advocates of this approach assert that "the spirit of commercial reasonableness" pervasive throughout the New York
Code supports the application of the rebuttable presumption

97 See, e.g., Security Trust Co. at 247, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 514 (holding that
noncomplying creditors may still recover deficiency judgment by proving: amount of debt,
fair market value of collateral and resulting deficiency); see Dalton, supra note 70,
at 820 (explaining rebuttable presumption rule and its general application); Page,

supra note 11, at 535-36 (reporting on rebuttable presumption or "shift" approach
and requirements for proving creditor's deficiency under said rule).
" Associates Capital Servs. Corp. v. Riccardi, 408 A.2d 930, 934 (R.I. 1979); see
also In re Excello Press, Inc., 890 F.2d 896, 904-05 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing importance
of evidence of fair market value in evaluating commercially reasonable sale); Dischner v. United Bank Alaska, 631 P.2d 107, 110 (Alaska 1981) (requiring showing of
clear and convincing evidence of fair and reasonable value of collateral in order to
rebut presumption).
In Kobuk Eng'g & Contracting Servs., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr. CoAlaska, 568 P.2d 1007, 1013-14 (Alaska 1977), the Supreme Court of Alaska noted
two ways in which the presumption may be rebutted: "(1) obtaining a fair and reasonable appraisal at or near the time of repossession, or (2) producing convincing
evidence of the value of the collateral." Id. To meet this last requirement, the creditor must prove both the condition of the collateral and the usual price collateral in a
similar of such condition would bring. Id. at 1014. This burden can be accomplished
through both testimonial and documentary evidence. See Dalton, supra note 70, at
821. The sale price can only be used to prove the value if the sale was commercially
reasonable; otherwise, some other proof of fair market value must be proffered. Id.
See generally Page, supra note 11, at 548-51 (discussing price, stipulations, appraisals, market conditions, and subsequent sales as types of evidence used to establish value).
9 See Dalton, supra note 70, at 820 ("Unless the presumption is rebutted, the se-

cured party may not recover a deficiency.").
100 In this situation, the fair market value of the collateral at the time of the sale,
not the actual proceeds from the sale, will be subtracted from the debt in order to
ascertain the amount of the deficiency. See Cornett v. White Motor Corp., 209
N.W.2d 341, 344 (Neb. 1973).

1996]

SURVEY OFNEW YORK PRACTICE

rule.' The facts concerning the sale of the collateral are usually
within the creditor's knowledge." 2 This is especially true where
the debtor received no notice of the sale, was not present at the
sale, and thus would have great difficulty proving the extent of
his loss. It is also argued that it is more appropriate to place the
burden of proof upon the party who failed to comply with the
statute. 10 3
The fault inherent in this rule is its failure to recognize the
debtor's remedies provided in section 9-507(1). Courts that adopt
this approach imply that the secured party is punished and the
debtor is compensated by the creation of the presumption that
the fair market value of the property is equal to the debt. 'MT In
situations where the creditor's noncompliance was due to a failure to conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner,
this may be true. In those situations, the debtor is injured because the collateral was not sold at its fair market value and the

See General Elec. Credit Corp., 79 A.D.2d at 511, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (holding
that "spirit of commercial reasonableness" leads to acceptance of rebuttable presumption rule); see also United States v. Willis, 593 F.2d 247, 260 (6th Cir. 1979)
(calling rebuttable presumption rule "more enlightened and equitable" than absolute
bar rule); Ruden v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 638 A.2d 1225, 1239 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1994) (noting that rule represents "a fair accommodation between the legitimate interests of the debtor and the [creditor]"), cert. denied, 647 A.2d 445 (Md.
1994); see also Page, supra note 11, at 536-47 (discussing trend of courts emphasizing policy of commercial reasonableness).
10 See Woodward v. Resource Bank, 436 S.E.2d 613 (Va. 1993). In Woodward, the
court focused on the fact that the secured party acquired possession of the collateral
and conducted the sale. Id. at 617. In light of this fact, the court concluded that "the
secured party is in the best position to present.evidence of the fair market value of
the collateral." Id.
103 See In re Winer, 39 B.R. 504, 511 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984) (concluding "the
proper and equitable construction of the Uniform Commercial Code ... is in accordance with this middle ground position"); Shawmut Bank v. Chase, 609 N.E.2d 479,
483 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that placing burden of proof on party failing to
follow statute is more likely to encourage future compliance). In Bank of Chapmanyille v. Workman, 406 S.E.2d 58, 65 (W. Va. 1991), the court continued its analogy of
the debtor and the surgery patient, see supra note 92, and analogized the availability of res ipsa loquitur for rescuing the surgery patient to the rebuttable presumption rule which rescues the debtor. Id. Since a debtor who was not present at the
sale is similar to an unconscious patient, it seems only fair to create a presumption
where the misbehaving party is required to rebut the evidence before recovering its
deficiency. Id.
," Shawmut Bank, 609 N.E.2d at 483 ("[Wle think the rebuttable presumption
approach ... is fairer."); Bank of Chapmanville,406 S.E.2d at 65 ("For the victim of a
commercially unreasonable disposition of collateral, the 'rebuttable presumption'
rule comes to the rescue.").
"'
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presumption rule corrects this. 105 But in situations where the
debtor has received no notice and as a result has lost the right to
redeem or to be involved in the sale, other damages may be
due." 6 In this latter situation, the rebuttable presumption rule
is insufficient to compensate the debtor. The Code explicitly
107 a proviprovides
for damages
to the debtor
in section
sion the rebuttable
presumption
approach
fails9-507(1),
to recognize.
D. The Siemens CreditApproach
In Siemens Credit Corp. v. Marvik Colour, Inc.," 8 the Southern District of New York formulated a combination of the rebuttable presumption and setoff rules stating that this approach
"best balances the interests at stake."' 9 This approach most accords with the goals and policies of the Uniform Code because it
both encourages the secured party to comply with section 9504(3) and compensates the debtor for his damages, if any are
proven."0 "When both the debtor and the secured creditor are at
fault, an appropriate remedy must compensate both without unduly punishing either.""'
105 See, e.g., Bank of Chapmanville, 406 S.E.2d at 65 (explaining that rebuttable
presumption rule favors debtors by presuming that collateral's fair market value
equals amount of remaining debt).
106 See Rushton v. Shea, 423 F. Supp. 468 (D. Del. 1976). The court stated that
there are three purposes to the notice requirement: (1) it gives the debtor the opportunity to exercise the right of redemption; (2) it gives the debtor the opportunity to
challenge the disposition of the collateral prior to the sale; and (3) the debtor is
provided with the opportunity to seek out other purchasers for the collateral. Id. at
469.
107 See supra note 86 (discussing exclusivity of remedies provided in § 9-507(1)).
'os 859 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
109 Id. at 692. The Siemens court stated that the New York Court of Appeals
"would probably allow debtors to recover damages for lack of notice, thereby applying the setoff rule as well as the rebuttable presumption rule." Id. at 693. The
Southern District couched its language in this manner because it was required to
predict what the New York Court of Appeals would do if presented the issue. See
Murray v. Miner, 74 F.3d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[B]ecause there is no New York
authority on the issue before us, we must attempt to deduce what New York's highest court would decide.") (citations omitted); Cunninghame v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 652 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[Tlhe federal
court must make an estimate of what the state's highest court would rule to be its
law.").
110 Siemens Credit Corp., 859 F. Supp. at 692. The court concluded that under the
combination rule, "the debtor is not required to pay any more or any less than it
would have paid if notice had been given, and the secured party has incentive to
provide notice of sale to the debtor." Id.
"' Dalton, supra note 70, at 832.
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In fact, many courts and at least one commentator have defined the rebuttable presumption rule to include the setoff rule."'
This "combination" approach shifts the burden of proof to the
creditor to prove the fair market value of the collateral in the
event of alleged noncompliance;. if rebutted, the deficiency is
then offset by the amount of damages, if any, the debtor has
proven.' Adopting the rebuttable presumption rule without the
setoff rule completely ignores the only New York Code provision
which purports to discuss remedies for creditor noncompliance.
As expressly held by the court in Siemens Credit, the application
of the rebuttable presumption rule does not preclude the use of
the setoff rule."'
Although the Siemens Credit approach has been criticized on
the grounds that it may result in confusion in its application,"6
See, e.g., United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692, 695-96 (5th Cir.
1974) (stating that notwithstanding rebuttable presumption, "§ 9-507 clearly gives
debtor the right to recover [damages]"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1975); Associates
Fin. Servs. Co., Inc. v. DiMarco, 383 A.2d 296, 302 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978) (concluding
that debtor may offset against deficiency for any loss incurred); Westgate State
Bank v. Clark, 642 P.2d 961, 969 (Kan. 1982) (holding that, under rebuttable presumption rule, debtor is entitled to setoff for damages incurred); Holt v. Peoples
Bank, 814 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1991) (concluding that damage caused to debtor
should be deducted from deficiency judgment when using rebuttable presumption);
see also Formanek, supra note 70, at 160-61.
[T]he secured party ... is not absolutely barred from a deficiency judgment
...[but] must rebut a presumption that the collateral was worth the
amount of the debt by evidence other than the price received at the resale
..If the secured party is successful, he or she is awarded a deficiency
judgment, offset by any damages the debtor may be entitled to under section 9-507(1).
112

Id.

"

Formanek, supra note 70, at 160-61 (stating that "[t]he securedparty bears the

burden of proving that a deficiency would have resulted from a 'sale'") (emphasis
added).
'" See, e.g., Business Dev. Corp. v. Contestabile, 413 S.E.2d 447, 448 (Ga. 1992)
(describing debtor's right to set-off under rebuttable presumption rule); Emmons v.
Burkett, 353 S.E.2d 908, 910 (Ga. 1987) ("Any loss suffered by the debtor as a consequence of the failure to give notice or to conduct a commercially reasonable sale is
recoverable ... and may be set off against the deficiency."); Bradford v. General Elec.
Credit Corp., 359 S.E.2d 757, 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing debtor's right to
set-off under rebuttable presumption rule); Liberty Bank v. Honolulu Providoring
Inc., 650 P.2d 576, 583 (Haw. 1982) (including debtor's right to setoff as part of rebuttable presumption rule); Security Sav. Bank v. Tranchitella, 592 A.2d 284, 290
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (describing manner in operations of rebuttable presumption rule).
1
859 F. Supp. at 693.
...
E.g., Associates Capital Servs. Corp. v. Riccardi, 408 A.2d 930, 934 (R.I. 1979)
("To us, these precedents [which follow the combination rule] appear to chart a dan-
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it is difficult to conceive of such a situation. Many courts presently incorporate the damages provision of section 9-507(1) into
the rebuttable presumption rule. Thus, application of the combination rule seems to be occurring without courts realizing it.
The real confusion stems from the continued application of three
different rules not only in the four Departments of New York's
Appellate Division,"' but also throughout the entire country,
with variations in result based on which portion of the statute
has been violated.
Whereas the various rules presently applied by the New
York courts promote confusion, the "combination approach"
"provides an adequate deterrent to an improper sale on the part
of a creditor, and sufficiently protects the debtor's interest, without arbitrarily penalizing the creditor.""'
Thus, New York
should adopt the Siemens Credit approach, either legislatively'
or judicially, to solve this problem once and for all.
III. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO NEW YORK'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
"The aim of [Article 9] ... is to provide a simple and unified
structure within which the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and
with greater certainty."2 ' In light of this asserted goal and the
New York Court of Appeals' failure to address the issue, the
proper way to deal with the split of authority in New York is by
legislative amendment.1 2 1 In 1983, New York's Law Revision
gerous course because of the possible confusion that may result when determining
which standard applies.").
117 A close look at New York case law demonstrates the controversy between the
three current approaches in dealing with creditor noncompliance. Courts do not always face the issue of debtor's damages, either because actual damage to the debtor
is not substantial enough to warrant a counterclaim or because the case is before
the court on a motion for summary judgment. At least two New York courts in the
Fourth Department have addressed the issue of debtor's damages. See S.M. Flickinger Co. v. 18 Genesee Corp., 71 A.D.2d 382, 386, 423 N.Y.S.2d 73, 76 (4th Dep't
1979) (adopting rebuttable presumption rule and allowing debtor to protect rights
under § 9-507(1)); Security Trust Co. v. Thomas, 59 A.D.2d 242, 245, 399 N.Y.S.2d
511, 513 (4th Dep't 1977) (stating that while debtor cannot bar action for deficiency,
debtor may recover damages).
11 Emmons, 353 S.E.2d at 911.
19 See infra Part III.
,20 N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-101 Official Comment at 291 (McKinney 1990).
2' For example, in 1991, the Nebraska Legislature rejected the long standing absolute bar rule and amended Nebraska's Uniform Commercial Code to adopt the rebuttable presumption rule. Anderson, supra note 72, at 3.
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Commission ("Commission") proposed an amendment to section
9-504.122 In short, the Commission recommended that Article 9
be amended to apply the absolute bar rule to transactions involving $5,000 or less and the rebuttable presumption rule to all others. 3 The reason for the distinction between transactions above
and below $5,000 is effectively to make creditor noncompliance
an absolute bar in consumer transactions and apply the rebuttable presumption rule in commercial transactions. 4
The Commission's proposal would have created a rule which
was perhaps sound in theory, but would have been difficult to
administer in practice. An arbitrary, bright-line rule based upon
a dollar amount precludes courts from considering the individual
transaction to determine if the behavior of the parties was
proper. Thus, the consumer/commercial distinction should be
considered in the first instance when evaluating whether the
creditor acted in a commercially reasonable manner before the
court has decided that the creditor has not complied with the
statute.'
Additionally, the Commission recommended the
adoption of the absolute bar rule for consumer transactions
which, as previously discussed, is an unduly harsh punishment
for the creditor; 6 after all, it was the defaulting debtor who is to
blame for this situation in the first place. An unduly harsh
penalty may discourage the extension of credit, ultimately
harming the same debtor that the New York Code wishes to protect. Lastly, the Commission's proposal directly contradicts section 9-507(2) which explicitly grants the creditor a deficiency
judgment, thus injecting a new penalty into the New York Code
that did not previously exist.
The codification of the rule adopted by the Southern District
of New York in Siemens Credit would be a more equitable solution, and one which is more in line with the policies underlying
the New York Code. Section 9-507 should be amended by adding

'4 Memorandum of the Law Revision Commission Relating to the Right of a Secured Party to Recover a Deficiency Judgment Under Part 5 of Article 9 of the New
York Uniform Commercial Code, [1983] N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP., reprinted in
[1983] N.Y. Laws 433 (McKinney).
'2 Id. at 472-73; accord Temm, supra note 66, at 22.
2' See, e.g., Temm, supra note 66, at 22.
"2 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of commercial reasonableness).
...
See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing advantages and disadvantages of absolute bar rule).
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a new subsection (3) to read as follows:
(3) If the secured party fails to comply with the requirements
for disposition of collateral pursuant to section 9-504(3) of this
Part, reasonable notification and a commercially reasonable
sale, a rebuttable presumption will arise that the fair market
value of the collateral is equal to the outstanding debt. In order
to recover any deficiency judgment, the secured party must affirmatively prove (a) that the fair market value of the collateral
is less than the outstanding debt and (b) the amount of the resulting deficiency (fair market value less the outstanding debt).
If the secured party is successful in rebutting this presumption,
the debtor shall be responsible for the resulting deficiency less
any damages available under subsection (1) of this Section.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted in New York in
an attempt to simplify and alleviate the rigorous demands of the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act. It was intended to create a uniform set of rules which judges and practitioners could apply with
little trouble. With respect to a noncomplying creditor's right to
a deficiency judgment, however, the New York Appellate Division has adopted three very different approaches among the
court's four departments.
The Southern District of New York in Siemens Credit Corp.
v. Marvik Colour,Inc. created a fourth approach which combines
two already existing approaches. This "combination" approach
best balances the competing interests of the creditor in recovering its investment, and the debtor in being protected from, and
even compensated for, actions of unscrupulous creditors. Absent
a decisive statement from the Court of Appeals of New York, the
legislature should intervene by codifying the approach created in
Siemens Credit. By so acting, the legislature will further the
goal of the Uniform Commercial Code creating a uniform set of
laws that can be relied upon to counsel their clients.
Erika L. Weinberg

